Quarterly earnings guidance and real earnings management
研究了季度盈利预测是否导致实际盈余管理，发现季度预测能降低短视行为，但预测与盈余管理存在内生关联，问题更多出现在不频繁发布预测或发布好消息预测的公司。
Abstract We examine if quarterly earnings guidance induces real earnings management. Quarterly guidance may cause myopia and inefficient decision‐making, if managers become overly concerned with setting and beating short‐term earnings targets. We test these associations on a large sample of US firms. Our evidence suggests that quarterly guidance is informative and lowers myopic incentives. However, our analyses also reveal endogenous associations exist between guidance and real earnings management. In contrast with existing concerns over frequent guiders, we find that guidance appears problematic in infrequent guiders, and in firms that issue good news earnings guidance and that operate in settings where earnings pressures are high.