BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH
研究美国六十年间福利支出占比上升的原因，发现不平等增长（顶层收入增长而底层停滞）和预算规则赋予低收入者谈判权力是关键因素。
Abstract Entitlements have become an increasing component of total government spending in the United States over the last six decades. Using a political‐economy model where parties bargain over taxes and entitlements, we argue that such dynamics can be explained by two factors: “unequal growth,” where top earners became richer while the income of the bottom 50% stagnated, and budget rules that provide bargaining power to low‐income earners through a “status quo effect.” In a model calibrated to the United States, we show that sustained bargaining power by a party representing the poor results in a rising share of entitlements consistent with the data.