Ordeal by innocence in the big‐data era: Intended data breach disclosure, unintended real activities manipulation
研究发现美国各州强制披露数据泄露的法律，反而导致企业CEO通过生产运营管理操纵真实盈余，加剧了股价崩盘风险并抑制了专利活动，揭示了客户保护法规的信息质量副作用。
Abstract We demonstrate an unintended consequence of mandatory disclosure of data breaches: the distortion of firms' real business activities. Employing the staggered adoption of data breach disclosure laws across various US states, we show that mandatory disclosure exacerbates CEOs' real earnings manipulation through production and operation management, which is more pronounced for firms of which the outbreak of data breaches is more of a concern and under stronger short‐term market pressure. The law adoption is associated with higher stock price crash risk and fewer patenting activities. Our findings reveal side effects of certain customer‐protection regulations in view of dampened information quality.