The certifier for the long run
构建了一个长期视角下的认证机构模型，研究不同目标（如关注质量与外部性、关注企业利润）的认证机构如何影响企业进入、投资和市场均衡，并探讨了社会最优与均衡中认证机构的选择。
We build a workhorse model to study the optimal and the equilibrium certifier from a long-run perspective. Firms enter the market, and invest in their capacity to provide quality, before the certification threshold is determined. With a certifier that cares about quality and externalities (such as an NGO), the threshold is demanding and the firms’ profits are small. Anticipating this, only a few firms enter the market, and they invest heavily. With a certifier mostly concerned with the firms’ profits (such as an industry association), the results are reversed. The relative importance of externalities, investments, and entry determines the socially optimal certifier identity as well as the type of certifier that is most likely to operate in equilibrium. The theory’s predictions are empirically testable and shed light on the variety of certifiers across markets and over time.