Taxation, accountability, and cash transfers: Breaking the resource curse
研究资源丰富国家治理差的原因，认为政府不依赖税收是主因，通过博弈模型说明低税收与弱治理可形成均衡，提出用现金转移换取税收以打破资源诅咒。
Why is governance in resource-rich countries so poor? We argue that it is because governments in these countries do not rely on taxation, which is an important instrument for citizens to hold their governments accountable. Using a game-theoretic model, we show that the combination of low taxes and weak governance can be an equilibrium in an economy with sizeable mineral revenues. As income from natural resources ultimately declines, replacing it with tax revenues may require governments to give control of these proceeds to citizens, in the form of cash transfers say, as a credible commitment to accountability, thereby breaking the country out of its resource curse.