Firm behavior during an epidemic
研究了企业在流行病环境中如何内部化员工感染，发现企业通过增加远程办公和轮岗有效抗疫，补贴远程办公减少感染，而补贴病假反而增加感染，政府若重视生命会容忍短期产出损失以严格限制疫情。
We derive a model in which firms operate in an epidemic environment and internalize infections among their employees in the workplace. The model is calibrated to fit the moments of the Covid-19 epidemic. We show that firms have incentives to fight against infections and can do so very effectively by increasing teleworking and rotating employees between on-site work, teleworking, and leave. The fight against infections in firms flattens the aggregate infections curve. Subsidies to teleworking reduce infections and save lives. Subsidies to sick leave reduce the cost of sick workers and raise workplace infections. Firms delay and weaken the fight against infections during economic downturns. We also consider the problem of a government that values output and lives. We show that the government prefers to severely restrict the epidemic by tolerating short-term output losses when it has a high valuation of life.