Neglected Peers in Merger Valuations
研究发现投资银行在并购估值中选为可比同行的公司，后续被收购的可能性是对照组的两倍多；未被收购的同行公司吸引更多机构关注、业绩良好，但投资者在并购公告时对同行身份反应不足，做多同行做空对照可获年化15.6%的alpha。
Abstract Using novel merger valuation data, we show that firms selected by investment banks as “comparable peers” are more than twice as likely to later become takeover targets themselves compared to matched control firms. Peer firms not subsequently acquired attract more institutional ownership and analyst coverage, deliver strong operating performance, reduce investments, and increase payouts. Investors are inattentive, though, to peer identification at the time of merger filings’ public disclosure. A portfolio that longs peers and shorts controls earns up to 15.6$\%$ alpha annually, which mainly comes from the long leg and is difficult to explain by short-sale constraints. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.