Turning out for redistribution: the effect of voter turnout on top marginal tax rates
研究了1974至2013年间OECD国家选民投票率对最高边际税率的影响，发现投票率提高会推高对高收入者的税率，且除最富裕群体外，人们更偏好对富人增税而非扩大政府开支。
Abstract I investigate the impact of voter turnout on top marginal tax rates in OECD countries between 1974 and 2013. I find that higher turnout leads to higher taxes for top earners, a result broadly consistent with the median voter theorem. Using novel survey data, I confirm that individuals in all but the wealthiest income bracket prefer higher taxes on the rich more than they prefer greater government spending in the economy. In line with these preferences, I find that turnout has a significantly negative effect on top income shares but no effect on the size of government or on public welfare expenditure. An instrumental variables approach confirms my findings. Overall, the paper is the first of its kind to link turnout to measures of redistribution that affect top earners and to preferences for redistribution.