Director Job Security and Corporate Innovation
研究发现，当董事面临职业不安全时，企业会变得保守，减少专利产出尤其是探索性专利和引用，这种效应在董事解雇成本高或企业需要董事会专业知识时更强，但机构投资者的创新专长能缓解。
Abstract In this article, we show that firms can become conservative in innovation when their directors face job insecurity. We find that after the staggered enactment of majority voting legislation that strengthens shareholders’ power in director elections, firms produce fewer patents, particularly exploratory patents, and fewer forward citations. This effect is stronger for directors facing higher dismissal costs or threats and for firms with greater needs for board expertise and is mitigated by institutional investors’ expertise in innovation. Overall, our results suggest that heightened job insecurity induces director myopia, which leads to a reduction in investment in risky, long-term innovation projects.