国际环境协议与不完善的执行:来自CITES的证据

International environmental agreements and imperfect enforcement: Evidence from CITES

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · 2023
被引 23
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

研究结合野生动物种群数据和CITES成员国及物种保护历史,发现物种被列入CITES超过20年后,在执法严格的国家种群数量增加约66%,表明执行比贸易限制类型更关键。

Abstract

International environmental agreements address global environmental problems such as the decline in biodiversity. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) regulates international trade in wildlife to prevent its decline. Discussions about CITES’ effectiveness abound, but evidence is lacking. We combine the largest available panel database on wildlife populations with the history of countries’ membership and species’ protection under CITES. We find that after more than 20 years of a species’ inclusion into CITES, wildlife populations increase by about 66% in countries with thorough enforcement, irrespective of whether trade in the species is only restricted or completely banned under CITES. Our results suggest re-focusing discussions away from whether CITES should partially restrict trade or impose a complete trade ban, and towards better enforcement. More generally, we find that enforcement is crucial for effective international environmental agreements.

CITES野生动物保护执法效果国际贸易管制