Power concentration and bottom‐up information flow: Evidence from Chinese municipal congresses
研究认为执政党强力控制会助长权力集中，抑制自下而上的信息流动。以中国市级人大为例，发现强力控制显著减少了立法者提出的政策提案、建议和批评，且当党内领导人预期未来掌权时效果更明显。
Abstract Power concentration may impede bottom‐up information flow. This article argues that strong ruling party control may facilitate the power concentration of ruling elites, which breeds reticence and impedes bottom‐up information flow. Using Chinese municipal congresses as a case, I establish that strong ruling party control significantly reduces the number of policy proposals, suggestions, and criticisms from legislators. The reduction effect of ruling party control on upward information is more salient when party leaders are expected to gain power in the future. Further analysis rules out alternative mechanisms: leadership style, composition of legislators, and local grievance.