Environmental policies in a Stackelberg differential game
构建了一个Stackelberg微分博弈模型，分析可交易许可证和排放税两种政策工具对经济活动的影响，发现最优解动态一致，且环境政策显著影响经济活动的水平和结构。
Abstract We develop a Stackelberg differential game to analyze the economic effects of the reduction plan through two policy instruments, tradable permits and taxes on emissions. Emissions are a by‐product of firm output. The authority acts as a Stackelberg leader, able to set the optimal instrument's level in the light of a finite‐horizon environmental target. We show that the optimal solution of the game is dynamically consistent. Moreover, optimal environmental policies substantially impact the level and composition of economic activity. The differentiation between “clean” and “dirty” firms allows us to assess distributional effects and how environmental technology may influence the game's outcome. Results are shown to be robust under different parameterizations.