Information Aggregation via Contracting
研究分散信息的投资者如何通过按风险容忍度分配利润的简单合同，改变其风险承担激励，从而在联合投资中实现信息聚合，为理性预期均衡模型提供替代方案。
ABSTRACT When a group of investors with dispersed private information jointly invest in a risky project, how should they divide the project's profit? We show that a simple contract dividing profits in proportion to investors' risk tolerances may facilitate information aggregation by altering investors' risk‐taking incentives when they decide on how investment strategies respond to private information. Our results provide a contracting‐based approach for information aggregation, which is an alternative to learning from endogenous market variables (e.g., prices) via contingent schedules as seen in well‐known rational expectations equilibrium models.