What drives risk-taking incentives embedded in bank executive compensation? Some international evidence
利用26个国家135家上市银行的手工收集面板数据，研究发现投资者保护越强，银行高管薪酬中的风险承担激励（vega）越高，且在银行竞争更激烈、安全网更广的国家中该效应更强。
This paper analyzes the country determinants of risk-taking incentives embedded in bank executive compensation using hand-collected international panel data on 135 publicly-traded banks in 26 countries. We exploit time-series changes in investor protection within a country and confirm that stronger protection leads to a higher vega. Moreover, the positive effect on vega is higher in countries where stronger bank competition and more extensive safety nets increase bank shareholders' risk-taking incentives. Our analysis controls for changes in bank regulation, systemic banking crises, and government bailouts. The results are robust to alternative specification models, alternative proxies for country determinants, and remain when we apply a more traditional cross-sectional analysis.