Rational Altruism
提出一种博弈论均衡概念，让自利代理人通过最优选择关心对手福利来内生促成合作，适用于囚徒困境等利益不完全对立的情形。
This article proposes a game-theoretic equilibrium concept promoting endogenous cooperation through self-interested agents optimally choosing how much they care about their opponents’ welfare. Rationally altruistic equilibria always exist in finite games as long as a publicly observed signal is available. Characterizations of the equilibrium concept highlight that it is most likely to have a bite when players’ interests are sufficiently dissimilar but not diametrically opposed to each other—such as in the prisoner’s dilemma. In the presence of more than two players, rational altruism can take an opportunistic form and serve as a device of collusion through implicit coalition formation.