Supply and Demand Effects of Bank Bailouts: Depositors Need Not Apply and Need Not Run
研究了银行救助对存款供给和银行需求的影响，发现救助主要降低了银行的存款需求，但在某些情况下也削弱了存款人的市场纪律。
Abstract We address two key issues concerning bank bailout effects on depositor and bank behavior. The first is whether bailouts weaken or strengthen market discipline by depositors through deposit supplies. The second is if bailed‐out banks decrease or increase their deposit demands. These questions can only be adequately addressed by analyzing the effects of bailouts on both deposit quantities and prices. We do so for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) bailouts. Overall, we find that demand changes empirically dominate supply changes, and suggest significantly reduced deposit demand from bailouts. In some cases, however, supply changes dominate and indicate weakened market discipline.