Share repurchases on trial: Large‐sample evidence on share price performance, executive compensation, and corporate investment
基于美国三十年大样本数据，检验对股票回购的常见批评，发现回购对股价影响微小、不导致高管过度薪酬或挤占投资，认为无需严格监管。
Abstract Using a large sample of US stocks covering more than three decades, we empirically examine common criticisms of and rationales for stock repurchases. Repurchases account for a tiny fraction of the trading volume in a typical stock, making their price impact too small to generate short‐term price manipulation. Price appreciation following repurchases is modest and does not reverse on average, suggesting the small price increases following repurchases signal firms’ good prospects. Also, we find no evidence that CEOs of repurchasing firms are paid excessively or that repurchases crowd out valuable investment opportunities. Because repurchases do not appear to be systematically abusive, enforcement action should be sufficient to deal with any bad actors, and significant regulation seems unwarranted.