Tax policies and agency costs
研究发现，大型企业与小型企业适用不同税制时，投资不足与过度投资的代理成本会显著变化；累进税制下的代理成本高于累退税制，但若管理者能发行债务转移成本，结果则相反。
Abstract We show that when large corporations are subject to a different tax system than smaller firms, the agency cost of under‐ and overinvestment is significantly altered. In contrast to the findings in the literature, the gap between the first‐ and second‐best investment trigger prices do not move in lockstep with variations in the corporate tax rate, as in the case of a linear tax system. We show that the gap can either widen or shrink, depending on the tax policy design and regime. In addition, we find that the agency cost under a progressive tax regime is considerably larger than the agency cost under a regressive tax regime when equityholders have to bear all the investment costs. These results are reversed when managers have the ability to issue additional debt to finance the firm's expansion and transfer part of the investment costs to bondholders.