God games: An experimental study of uncertainty, superstition, and cooperation
通过修改公共品博弈实验，引入计算机代理调整收益，模拟一神论、无神论和不可知论三种情境，发现所有调整情境下被试的贡献均显著高于标准博弈，且迷信行为在准一神论情境中最强。
This paper uses a novel lab experiment to test claims about the origins and functions of religion. We modify the standard public goods game, adding a computer-based agent that adjusts earnings in ways that might depend on players' contributions. Our treatments employ three different descriptions of the adjustment process that loosely correspond to monotheistic, atheistic, and agnostic interpretations of the computer's role. The adjustments neither mask players' contributions nor magnify their impact. Yet players in all three adjustment treatments contribute much more than those who play the standard public goods game. Players' contributions and survey responses show that adjustments induce superstitions in all treatments, with the strongest superstitions appearing in the quasi-monotheistic treatment and the weakest in the quasi-atheistic treatment. Text-based communication raises contributions and strengthens coordination. But when paired with the quasi-monotheistic description, communication also promotes counterproductive quests for winning numbers.