Two-Stage Contests with Private Information
研究了在私人信息下两阶段竞赛的均衡，低能力者假装强、高能力者假装弱，导致第一阶段出现部分混同均衡，并分析了奖金分配和类型分布对产出、收益和意外胜利概率的影响。
In perfectly discriminating contests with private information, low-ability contestants prefer to appear strong, while high-ability contestants prefer to appear weak. In a two-stage contest, this leads to a unique symmetric equilibrium with partial pooling in the first stage. A higher output in the first contest leads to a weakly higher belief about the contestant’s ability entering the second contest. We characterize this unique equilibrium when cost of effort is linear and show how the prize allocation and type distribution impact contestants’ expected output, payoffs, and the probability of surprise victories.