A Theory of Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information
提出了一个研究不完全信息双边匹配市场的框架，定义了包含个体理性、无阻塞和信息稳定性的市场状态稳定性概念，并证明了稳定状态的存在性及信息粗化后的稳定性。
We provide a framework for studying two-sided matching markets with incomplete information. The framework accommodates two-sided incomplete information as well as heterogeneous information among the agents. We propose a notion called stability for a market state, which, based upon agents’ information structure, requires (i) individual rationality, (ii) no blocking, and (iii) information stability. The novelty of our stability notion lies in how the agents evaluate a blocking prospect in the presence of general two-sided incomplete information. We show that a stable state exists; moreover, if a state is stable, then coarsening agents’ information leads to another stable state.