Dynamic Information Design under Constrained Communication Rules
研究信息设计者在沟通受限时如何通过投资反馈说服代理人投资未知质量项目，发现两评级系统在需要实验时接近最优，但利他动机下约束规则会降低福利。
An information designer wishes to persuade agents to invest in a project of unknown quality. To do so, she must induce investment and collect feedback from these investments. Motivated by data regulations and simplicity concerns, our designer faces communication constraints. These constraints hinder her without benefiting the agents: they impose an upper bound on the induced belief spread, limiting persuasion. Nevertheless, two-rating systems (direct recommendations) are the optimal design when experimentation is needed to generate information and approximate the designer’s first-best payoff for specific feedback structures. When the designer has altruistic motives, constrained rules significantly decrease welfare.