Alert the Inert? Switching Costs and Limited Awareness in Retail Electricity Markets
利用比利时电力合同数据，区分转换成本和有限认知对消费者惰性的影响，发现两者均阻碍高效选择，缓解转换成本能带来显著福利提升，且受监管垄断可产生与当前放松管制市场相当的消费者剩余。
We quantify how switching costs and limited awareness affect consumer inertia in liberalized retail electricity markets by developing and estimating a structural demand model using a novel dataset on electricity contract choices in Belgium. Our data allow us to disentangle different sources of inertia by using a rich combination of macromoments and micromoments. We find that consumers perceive contracts as differentiated and both limited awareness and switching costs hinder efficient choices. Our counterfactuals reveal substantial welfare gains from alleviating both frictions, in particular switching costs, and that a well-regulated monopoly can generate similar consumer surplus as the current deregulated market.