Contest Design with Stochastic Performance
研究了在表现有噪声的竞赛中，如何通过内生化的分配规则来优化竞赛设计，包括设定优秀标准和随机奖项数量，并推导出最优的竞赛成功函数。
This paper studies optimal contest design in contests with noisy performance. Here, contest design is a team moral hazard problem that endogenizes the assignment rule that maps performance profiles into winning probabilities. The optimal design features endogenous standards for eligibility, and the number of prizes that are awarded may be stochastic. Generally, one group of agents is identified as “first claimants” of prizes, contingent on performance exceeding a threshold of excellence. However, which group wins prizes more often depends on the designer’s objective function and the performance technologies. Finally, the approach derives endogenous, microfounded, and fully optimal contest success functions.