Affirmative action and the choice of schools
利用巴西全国性配额政策，研究发现该政策使私立学校学生转向公立学校的比例增加31%，且转学者多来自低社会经济地位和低质量私立学校，但转学以就读更差公立学校为代价，并影响未直接受政策影响的群体的学校选择。
Socioeconomic-based affirmative action in higher education has gained importance following controversies over race-based alternatives. In many settings, these interventions use a school-based criterion that selects beneficiaries relative to their peers. Exploiting a nationwide quota policy in Brazil that reserved a large share of vacancies in higher education for public-school students, I show that the reform increases movements from private to public schools by 31% and that movers come disproportionately from low-SES and low-quality private schools. An exploration of the mechanisms shows that movers increase their future probability of higher education attendance at the expense of attending poorer and lower-performing public schools. The reform also leads to changes in school choice of indirectly exposed cohorts and general-equilibrium effects in the form of school closure.