SOEs and Soft Incentive Constraints in State Bank Lending
研究中国国有银行经理的放贷激励如何影响对国有企业的贷款，发现月末贷款量增加而质量下降，且对国有企业的贷款在违约后仍持续，可能加剧其软预算约束。
We study how Chinese state bank managers’ lending incentives impact lending to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We show lending quantity increases and quality decreases at month’s end, indicating monthly lending targets that decrease lending standards. Increased quantity comes from both SOEs and private lending, whereas decreased quality is from only SOEs, which continue to receive loans even after prior defaults (particularly at month’s end). We suggest that SOE lending may thus be beneficial for state bank managers, who lend to delinquent state enterprises to meet targets, which in turn may exacerbate SOEs’ soft budget constraints..