Manager‐specific shocks, financial constraints and conglomerate merger
本文提出联合大企业并购的一个新好处：管理者特定冲击使项目间相关性提高，反而有助于缓解融资约束，因为共同的管理冲击能更好地利用交叉抵押。
Abstract We provide a theory to identify a new benefit for conglomerate mergers. In this paper, projects are subject to manager‐specific shocks. Bringing projects under the same top management in a conglomerate increases the correlation of shocks. We show that this positive correlation, in contrast to traditional wisdom, enhances a firm's ability to relax financial constraints. This is because common managerial shocks help conglomerates better take advantage of cross‐pledging possibilities. This paper also contributes to the literature by providing one of the first studies to emphasize the role of manager‐specific shocks in shaping a firm's choice to be a conglomerate or standalone.