Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: Punishment or rent extraction?
研究委托人如何通过安排教学任务来激励代理人付出不可观测的研究努力，区分了惩罚（坏结果时安排无产出教学）和租金抽取（无论结果都安排教学但效用损失更大）两种机制，发现两者都可能提高研究努力。
A principal wants an agent to exert unobservable research effort. Ruling out negative payments implies that (i) the principal cannot punish bad outcomes and (ii) she cannot extract rents. We disentangle these two effects by allowing the principal to place verifiable teaching duties on the agent. In the first scenario, the principal can punish the agent with completely unproductive teaching duties conditional on bad research outcomes. In the second scenario, the agent is forced to teach regardless of research outcomes, though his teaching disutility is larger than the principal’s benefit. Each of the two scenarios may involve higher research efforts.