Fiscal Stimulus under Sovereign Risk
研究了政府面临主权风险时应对经济衰退的最优财政政策，发现扩大政府支出可能不可取，即使存在显著的凯恩斯稳定效应和不平等担忧。
What is the optimal fiscal policy response to a recession when the government is subject to sovereign risk? We study this question in a model of endogenous sovereign default with nominal rigidities. Increasing spending in a recession reduces unemployment, but it exposes the government to a debt crisis. We quantitatively analyze this trade-off between stimulus and austerity and find that expanding government spending may be undesirable, even in the presence of sizable Keynesian stabilization gains and inequality concerns. Consistent with these findings, we show that sovereign risk is a key driver of the fiscal procyclicality observed worldwide.