Local Evidence and Diversity in Minipublics
研究政策制定者如何从拥有地方证据的公民中挑选迷你公众，发现最优构成会过度代表边缘群体而不足代表中间群体，且代表性随不确定性非单调变化。
A policymaker selects a minipublic—a group of citizens from a demographically diverse citizenry with access to local evidence about the impact of a policy. Citizens face uncertainty about the policymaker’s eventual policy bias, which is shown to discourage the most marginally informative minipublic citizens from discovering their evidence. We fully characterize the optimal minipublic composition. Relative to the most demographically representative minipublic, the optimal minipublic overrepresents demographics at the margins of the citizenry while underrepresenting those around the median citizen. The representativeness of the optimal minipublic varies nonmonotonically with uncertainty. Our findings bear practical implications for minipublic design.