Board gender quotas and outward foreign direct investment: Evidence from France
研究发现法国董事会性别配额法律降低了企业对外直接投资的倾向，尤其是管理不善的企业，表明性别多元的董事会加强了管理监督。
Abstract We show that board gender quota laws reduce the propensity of French firms to undertake outward foreign direct investment. For this, we use firm‐level data for the period 2007 to 2015 and a difference‐in‐difference approach. The exogenous increase in the share of women directors decreases the share of foreign subsidiaries by 7 percentage points when the share of women directors is at its highest. The share of foreign subsidiaries is affected by the decrease in probability of having a foreign subsidiary, which indicates disinvestment. The effects on outward foreign direct investment we detect are strongest for the poorly managed firms, pointing to tough managerial monitoring by gender diverse boards as the driving force behind results.