Limiting Applications in College Admissions and Evidence from Conflicting Exam Dates
研究大学通过将入学考试安排在同一天来限制申请数量的策略，发现排名较低但仍有选择性的大学能借此吸引更优质的学生，并以台湾研究生入学考试为例验证了模型。
We present a college admissions problem in which colleges may benefit from limiting the number of applications; specifically, a strategy of administering their entrance exams on the same date. Our model shows that a lower-ranked but still-selective college can attract preferred students through this strategy. We test the model by using the entrance exams of graduate schools in Taiwan and find that student quality could be improved when colleges allow their departments to determine whether to use the strategy. Moreover, a department that has a small difference in prestige between it and the most prestigious department will tend to use the strategy to limit the number of applications.