Global digital platforms, technology transfer and foreign direct investment policies in two‐sided markets
研究外国企业与东道国政府在双边市场中对外商直接投资的两种模式（新建进入与收购本土平台）的偏好差异，发现技术转移、跨边网络外部性和平台服务差异化影响福利与利润排序，并指出非对称外资股权限制可引导企业选择福利最优模式。
Abstract This paper examines the preferences of a foreign firm and a host country government over two modes of FDI in two‐sided markets: de novo entry (through the establishment of a new platform) and acquisition of the domestic incumbent platform. Technology transfer, cross‐side network externalities and platform service differentiation determine the ranking of the host country welfare gains and the entrant's profits under the two entry modes. In the case where the foreign entrant and the host government disagree over the entry modes ranking, asymmetric foreign equity restrictions can induce the welfare‐optimal choice of the entry mode by the foreign firm.