Is there a risk of a winner’s curse in farmland auctions?
检验德国东部农田拍卖中竞拍者是否具有私人估值，发现存在共同价值成分，可能导致赢家诅咒和拍卖低效。
Abstract We test the assumption that bidders in farmland auctions have private valuations, a necessary condition for auction efficiency. We apply the test of Haile et al. (2003) to farmland auctions in Eastern Germany covering the price boom 2007–2020. To disentangle valuations from observed and unobserved heterogeneity, we develop a new approach relying on professional appraisals of the land. Based on our rich identification strategy, validation and robustness checks, we reject pure private valuations. We conclude that the presence of a common value in bidders’ valuations is very likely resulting in potentially inefficient land privatisation auctions and a winner’s curse.