A Model of Systemic Bank Runs
构建了一个可处理的系统性银行挤兑模型，分析银行间市场交易如何放大冲击，导致小冲击演变为系统性危机。
ABSTRACT We develop a tractable model of systemic bank runs. The market‐based banking system features a two‐layer structure: banks with heterogeneous fundamentals face potential runs by their creditors while they trade short‐term funding in the asset (interbank) market in response to creditor withdrawals. The possibility of a run on a particular bank depends on its assets' interim liquidation value, and this value depends endogenously in turn on the status of other banks in the asset market. The within‐bank coordination problem among creditors and the cross‐bank price externality feed into each other. A small shock can be amplified into a systemic crisis.