Sequential Learning
研究两个玩家序贯公开审查项目时，先动者可能伪造证据影响后动者，导致道德风险问题；发现早期策略不确定性可缓解此问题，混合策略均衡下早期可能伪造、后期证据真实，对研发、质量保证和药物审批有启示。
We develop a model in which two players sequentially and publicly examine a project. In our model the player who moves first can fabricate evidence to influence the second mover, which creates a moral hazard problem. We find that early strategic uncertainty can mitigate this problem. In particular, for intermediate prior beliefs about the project’s quality, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is in mixed strategies and consists of an early stage in which evidence may be fabricated and a later stage in which evidence is always authentic. Our findings shed light on the dynamics of R&D, quality assurance, and drug approval.