The Effects of Time Preferences on Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games
通过无限重复囚徒困境实验，研究了时间偏好如何影响合作：周支付（高折现因子）比月支付促进更多合作，延迟支付消除当前偏差后合作率更高。
This paper studies the effects of time preferences on cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game experiment. Subjects play repeated games in the lab, all decisions at once, but stage game payoffs are paid over an extended period of time. Changing the time window of stage game payoffs (weekly or monthly) varies discount factors, and a delay for the first-stage game payoffs eliminates/weakens present bias. First, subjects with weekly payments cooperate more than subjects with monthly payments—higher discount factors promote greater cooperation. Second, the rate of cooperation is higher when there is a delay—present bias reduces cooperation.