Ten Isn’t Large! Group Size and Coordination in a Large-Scale Experiment
通过银行挤兑博弈实验，发现群体规模影响协调结果：当高收益策略风险足够大时，十人小群体的行为不能预测大群体，大群体只协调于帕累托劣等策略，从不协调于太阳黑子。
We provide experimental evidence on coordination within large groups that could proxy the atomistic nature of real-world markets. We use a bank run game where the two pure-strategy equilibria can be ranked by payoff and risk dominance and a sequence of public announcements introduces stochastic sunspot equilibria. We find systematic group size effects that theory fails to predict. When the payoff-dominant strategy is risky enough, the behavior of small groups is uninformative of the behavior in large groups: unlike smaller groups of size ten, larger groups exclusively coordinate on the Pareto-inferior strategy and never coordinate on sunspots.