The Extension of Credit with Nonexclusive Contracts and Sequential Banking Externalities
研究发现，非排他性序列借贷会提高违约率并对先前贷款人产生外部性。基于信用卡申请数据，额外信贷额度使高信用评分借款人的违约率下降5.9个百分点，但使低信用评分借款人的违约率上升19个百分点，这对“非普遍违约”监管和金融包容性有启示。
Nonexclusive sequential borrowing can increase default and impose externalities on prior lenders. We document that sequential banking is pervasive with substantial effects. Using credit card applications from a large bank and data on the applicants’ entire loan portfolios, we find that an additional credit line causes a 5.9 percentage point decline in default for high-score borrowers on previous loans. However, for low-score borrowers, it causes a 19 percentage point increase. The former use the new credit to smooth payments on preexisting loans, while the latter increase their total debt. These results have implications for “ no-universal-default” regulation and financial inclusion.