Implications of Tax Loss Asymmetry for Owners of S Corporations
研究了S公司所有者面临的税收损失不对称问题，发现其每年价值约35亿美元，会抑制风险投资并导致资源配置低效，而《减税与就业法案》中的条款（特别是第199A条）能减少这种扭曲。
We study tax loss asymmetry for S corporate owners. These owners use most losses contemporaneously, reducing the tax asymmetry compared to C corporations. However, these owners face distortions due to the progressive individual tax schedule. The value of this asymmetry is approximately $3.5 billion per year. We find that this asymmetry creates disincentives for risky investment and causes allocative inefficiencies among loss and gains owners. Finally, we simulate the effects of certain provisions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act; we estimate that these provisions—especially section 199A—reduce the behavioral distortions of the asymmetry for S corporate owners.