Quid pro quo harassment, contracts and liability
本文研究了合同如何通过抑制效应和选择效应来减少交换条件性骚扰，并发现有效的雇主责任会导致工资与骚扰风险负相关，而无效责任下雇主可能选择低工资高骚扰的合同。
Abstract This paper identifies two channels through which contracts induce performance and contain quid pro quo harassment: a disincentive effect raises the cost for harassers and a selection effect that attracts whistleblower types raises potential victims' resistance. An effective employer liability generates a negative relationship between wages and harassment risk. If liability is ineffective, however, employers can opt for low‐wage contracts that induce high harassment and minimum internal complaints. In such environments, wages compensate exogenous harassment risks. Thus the wage‐harassment risk equation can signal effectiveness of employer liability.