Securities auctions with pre-project information management
研究了竞标者在赢得项目开发权后可以选择获取信息的证券拍卖，发现证券陡峭度影响信息获取激励，最优拍卖应采用债务证券以减少扭曲。
This paper analyzes securities auctions in which bidders have an option to acquire information after winning the right to develop a project. The payment consists of an up-front cash bid and a contingent security bid, which distorts investment and information acquisition relative to the first-best. We order securities in terms of their steepness: the payment of a steeper security is more sensitive to high project values. The agent’s incentives to acquire information that prevents either cost overruns (Type I errors) or false cancellations (Type II errors) decrease with the steepness of securities. The optimal limited-liability securities auction involves bidding debt that minimizes the distortions in the agent’s incentives to acquire performance-enhancing information. The model delivers implications on the practices commonly observed in oil lease auctions.