Bondholder representatives on bank boards: A device for market discipline
研究债券持有人在银行董事会中的代表能否有效降低银行风险，发现其显著降低风险且不影响盈利，尤其当代表有监管经验或与债券持有人关系密切时效果更强。
Abstract We examine whether board representation of bondholders can be an effective market discipline mechanism to reduce bank risk, using a unique dataset combining information on bondholders and boards of directors of European listed banks. Our results show that the influence of bondholder representatives on the bank board significantly reduces bank risk without impacting profitability. The beneficial effect of this market discipline mechanism is stronger when bondholder representatives have regulatory experience, current or long relationships with their affiliated bondholders, and for more complex banks. In contrast, the reducing impact on bank risk is smaller for banks with lower capitalization levels.