Designing Securities for Scrutiny
研究审查（如信用评级、分析师报告）如何影响知情发行人的证券设计，发现审查强度高时发行人倾向设计信息敏感型证券（杠杆股权），否则选择标准债务合同，审查通过减少发行人保留现金流来提升效率。
Abstract We investigate the effect of scrutiny (e.g., credit ratings, analyst reports, or mandatory disclosures) on the security design problem of a privately informed issuer. We show that scrutiny has important implications for both the form of security designed and the amount of inefficient retention of cash flows. The model predicts that issuers will design informationally sensitive securities (i.e., levered equity) when scrutiny is sufficiently intense. Otherwise, issuers opt for a standard debt contract. Scrutiny increases efficiency by decreasing issuers’ reliance on retention to signal quality and, perhaps counterintuitively, decrease price informativeness.