On guarantees, vetoes, and random dictators
研究了在n人概率投票/议价模型中，参与者能确保的最低福利水平（保障），发现当n≥p时唯一最大保障是均匀抽签；当n<p时，结合随机独裁与否决投票可得到一族最大保障机制。
A mechanism guarantees a certain welfare level to its agents, if each of them can secure that level against unanimously adversarial others. How high can such a guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it? In the n ‐person probabilistic voting/bargaining model with p deterministic outcomes a guarantee takes the form of a probability distribution over the ranks from 1 to p . If n ≥ p , the uniform lottery is shown to be the only maximal (unimprovable) guarantee. If n < p , combining (variants of) the familiar random dictator and voting by veto mechanisms yields a large family of maximal guarantees: it is exhaustive if n = 2 and almost so if p ≤ 2 n . Voting rules à la Condorcet or Borda, even in probabilistic form, are ruled out by our worst case viewpoint.