Pervasive signaling
研究了决策公开性增加（如社交媒体）如何影响社会信号传递扭曲的总成本，发现足够多的信号机会能让发送者以极低成本真实地传递自身类型。
How does the increasing publicness of decisions (due, e.g., to social media) affect the total costs of social signaling distortions? While pervasive signaling may induce pervasive distortions, it may also permit people to signal while distorting each choice to a smaller degree. Ironically, for a broad class of environments, a sufficient increase in the number of signaling opportunities allows senders to “live authentically,” that is, to signal their types at arbitrarily low overall cost. This result survives when social networking technologies expand signaling opportunities and audience size in tandem, provided the returns to the latter are not too great.