The Other Insiders: Personal Trading by Brokers, Analysts, and Fund Managers
研究发现，券商、分析师和基金经理等金融机构内部人员，在为自己账户买卖股票时，能在短期（一个月内）跑赢散户，尤其是在财报发布、分析师推荐调整和大股价变动前交易时收益更高，并存在抢先交易和信息泄露的证据。
Abstract When brokers, analysts, and fund managers buy or sell stocks for their own accounts, these “access employees” of financial institutions outperform retail investors over short windows up to a month. They earn particularly high abnormal returns when they trade before earnings announcements, revisions of analyst recommendations, and large stock price changes. We also find evidence consistent with profitable front-running and information leakage around the execution of corporate insider trades and block trades by mutual funds, as well as the release of revised recommendations by analysts who work at the same brokerage firm. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.