Steering Fallible Consumers
研究了在线中介利用消费者信息引导其购买的行为对易犯错消费者的福利影响，发现基于高质量错误信息的引导通常有害，甚至可能造成极大损害。
Abstract Online intermediaries with information about a consumer’s tendencies often ‘steer’ her toward products she is more likely to purchase. We analyse the welfare implications of this practice for ‘fallible’ consumers, who make statistical and strategic mistakes in evaluating offers. The welfare effects depend on the nature and quality of the intermediary’s information and on properties of the consumer’s mistakes. In particular, steering based on high-quality information about the consumer’s mistakes is typically harmful, sometimes extremely so. We argue that much real-life steering is of this type, raising the scope for a broader regulation of steering practices.