Democratization, leader education and growth: firm-level evidence from Indonesia
利用印度尼西亚各地区不同年份外生民主化的过程，研究发现当选市长的教育水平影响当地经济增长：非大学学历市长导致制造业就业下降5%，而大学学历市长则保持稳定，原因在于前者提高税收但减少基础设施投入且更易涉腐。
Abstract Does the economic success of democratization depend on newly elected leaders’ characteristics? We exploit the unique Indonesian democratization process, where districts exogenously democratized in different years. In a census of manufacturing plants, employment drops by 5% in districts that elect a non-college educated mayor, while employment stays constant under college graduates. Non-college educated mayors substantially raise taxation but provide less infrastructure, do not spend more on social programs, and are more often involved in corruption cases. Other leader attributes and district characteristics, as well as tests for pre-treatment trends, for selection on unobservables, and for close elections do not explain away the important role of leaders’ education in shaping local policies and growth.