Liability taxes, risk, and the cost of banking crises
研究了欧洲国家在全球金融危机后引入的银行负债税对风险与金融稳定的影响，发现该税通过降低银行间风险暴露、增加股本和资产风险权重，减少了银行部门风险，可能降低危机成本。
This study investigates the effects on risk and financial stability of the taxes on bank liabilities introduced across European countries after the global financial crisis. Using a difference-in-differences setup, we show that banks responded to the implementation of liability taxes by reducing their interbank exposure, and by increasing both equity, at least in the short term, and the risk weight of their assets. When we consider these adjustments in a microsimulation model for bank portfolio losses, we find that liability taxes reduce risk in the banking sector and could therefore decrease the cost of crises.